Which patients do I treat? An experimental study with economists and physicians by unknown
RESEARCH Open Access
Which patients do I treat? An experimental
study with economists and physicians
Marlies Ahlert1, Stefan Felder2* and Bodo Vogt3
Abstract
This experiment investigates decisions made by prospective economists and physicians in an allocation problem
which can be framed either medically or neutrally. The potential recipients differ with respect to their minimum
needs as well as to how much they benefit from a treatment. We classify the allocators as either ‘selfish’, ‘Rawlsian’,
or ‘maximizing the number of recipients’. Economists tend to maximize their own payoff, whereas the physicians’
choices are more in line with maximizing the number of recipients and with Rawlsianism. Regarding the framing,
we observe that professional norms surface more clearly in familiar settings. Finally, we scrutinize how the
probability of being served and the allocated quantity depend on a recipient’s characteristics as well as on the
allocator type.
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1 Introduction
Prioritizing medical services and redefining access to
health care are high on political agendas across the
globe. Several countries have appointed commissions to
define the rules for the health technology assessments
and cost-benefit analyses which guide allocation deci-
sions in health care. Experts on such panels, in particu-
lar health economists and health ethicists, tend to
ignore the fact that not all medical allocation decisions
can be made on the level of fixing general rules. If that
were feasible, trade-off decisions behind a veil of uncer-
tainty would involve only statistical lives. In fact, the
allocation of scarce medical resources and the pursuant
withholding of care cannot always be ‘pre-programmed’
by general rules. Not only will the individuals from
whom care must be withheld have a face and an iden-
tity, the allocator himself will be a specific individual
who will have to make an allocation choice in a specific
situation. Consequently, specific individuals are affected
by decisions over which the allocator has discretionary
powers. These within rule-choices (as opposed to the
choice of rules) are not determined by the rules. They
must be made by an allocator according to his
judgment.
It is therefore important to analyze which allocation is
chosen under which circumstances, and, in particular, to
evaluate how medical care is allocated in the conflict
between efficiency, selfish behavior, and the social orien-
tation of decision makers. The experimental method has
proven useful for testing theories on economic alloca-
tion. In particular, fairness ideals have been extensively
scrutinized in the experimental laboratory (for a recent
study see [1]). However, to our knowledge no experi-
mental test has been carried out in the medical setting
yet. We model the medical allocation problem and
experimentally test the power of several theoretical con-
cepts (ranging from utilitarianism to Rawlsian behavior)
to predict subjects’ choice behavior.
The goal of this paper is to study allocation decisions
by prospective physicians and econo-mists. The experi-
ment is designed to reveal when and how individuals
deviate from the self-regarding preferences induced by
the embedded monetary reward function. Will strict
payoff maximizers - individuals who conform to the pre-
ferences induced by the reward function - prevail, or
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will we find deviations from such behavior that signify
other relevant influences on the process of passing judg-
ment? Are the choices made more in line with utilitar-
ian principles or with an egalitarian rule a)? Do the
principles applied depend on the framing of the pro-
blem, and do economists decide differently than
physicians?
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the allocation problem and the solutions for four differ-
ent types of allocation rules. Based on these rules, we
characterize four classes of allocators: two utilitarian-
oriented types (social utilitarian and purely selfish) and
two types leaning towards egalitarianism (Rawlsian and
maximizing the number of recipients). Section 3
describes details of the experimental design, including
the characteristics of the potential recipients. We also
calculate and compare the payoffs for ideal types of the
four classes of allocators. In section 4, we classify the
subjects who participated in the experiment based on
their choices. We study the effects that arise from fram-
ing the allocation problem in a neutral and a medical
fashion, where the allocator is described as a physician
and the potential recipients as patients. Moreover, we
compare the choices made by economists and physi-
cians. In section 5, we investigate how the choices of
different types of allocators depend on the minimum
needs and productivity of potential recipients. In order
to find out which subgroup of recipients is served and
how much they receive, we first analyze the determi-
nants of a positive recipient payoff using a logit model.
Then we use ordinary least squares regression to analyze
the determinants of the size of a recipient’s payoff, con-
ditional on it being positive. Section 6 discusses and
summarizes our findings.
2 The allocation problem and possible solutions
In our experiment, an allocator distributes a resource
among seven potential recipients. The individual recipi-
ents each require a specific minimum quantity of the
resource in order to achieve a positive payoff. The
potential recipients also vary in their productivity at
transforming the quantity they receive into a payoff for
themselves. The allocator’s payoff is a function of the
sum of the recipients’ payoffs. Moreover, the allocator
faces a fixed fine for each individual he fails to serve (i.e.
the individual does not receive his minimum quantity
nor, therefore, a payoff). We do not set out to test the
validity of the assumed other-regarding concerns in this
paper. Such motives, however, appear to be prevalent in
common medical allocation situations b).
While a payoff maximizing allocator earns a maximal
profit, an allocator following a rule not dictated by the
preferences induced by the payoff function - for instance
an egalitarian rule - loses out on profits. The experiment
thus sheds light on the classic equity-efficiency tradeoff
in a setting in which efficiency is not judged against
purely selfish motives but relative to a complex
evaluation.
More specifically, the allocator (individual 0) allocates
ration ri to n individuals (i = 1, 2,..,n). With the endow-
ment given by R, the allocator’s choice is restricted by∑
i
ri ≤ R . The potential recipients are characterized by
two parameters, mi and pi. mi is the minimum ration an
individual needs to obtain a positive payoff, while pi is a
productivity factor, transforming the allocated ration
into a payoff for the recipient. In the medical setting, mi
represents a physician’s minimal time or effort required
to treat the patient and pi stands for the probability of
treatment success or the effectivity of the treatment.
The payoff of individual i = 1, 2,..,n is then
πi =
{
0, if ri < mi
ri · pi if ri ≥ mi
. (2)
The allocator incurs a fine equal to c for every indivi-
dual who does not receive the minimum ration mi c). In
the medical setting, c corresponds to the physician’s dis-
utility of not treating a patient. One might interpret this
as other-regarding preferences, typically due to empathy
or internalized professional norms d). c is the same for
all recipients who are not served and patients who are
not treated.
Finally, the allocator participates in the recipients’ pay-
offs with the factor t. This design feature introduces the
second element of other-regarding preferences on the
part of the allocator. The allocator’s payoff π0 is t times
the sum of the recipients’ payoffs, minus all fines e):







2.1 The own payoff maximizing allocator and the social
utilitarian allocator
The own payoff maximizing allocator OPMA maximizes
a target function
WOPMA (π0,π1,π2, ...,πn) = π0, (4)
where π0 is determined according to (3). His optimal
choice can be characterized as follows: He first ranks
the individuals in decreasing order of their productivity
factor pi, and then individuals with equal productivity in
increasing order of their minimum required amount mi.
Let K be the ranked set of possible recipients, with k =
1 as the most productive individual with the smallest
mi, (or one of them, if there are several). The allocator
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will serve k = 1 first, provided that m1 ≤ R. His remain-
ing endowment then amounts to R-m1. Secondly, in
consecutive order starting with k = 2, he will compare
each individual to k = 1 and perform the following dom-
inance test:
t ·mk · pk + c > t · mk · p1? (5)
The test calculates the opportunity costs of allocating
mk to the most productive individual. It consists of the
foregone revenue t·mk·pk and the fine c. If the opportu-
nity costs are larger than the revenue from allocating mk
to k = 1 (i.e. a positive test outcome), the OPMA will
serve k to the extent permitted by the remaining endow-
ment. This procedure is continued along the ranked set
K, spending mk if the individual k fulfills the test, and
stops once the remaining endowment is too small to
serve a further individual. The allocator will then give
the remainder to the most productive individual, since
this yields the maximal additional payoff. Note that if
the fine were zero, no individual except k = 1 could
pass the dominance test (p1 ≥ pk for all k), and the
OPMA would spend the entire endowment on the most
productive individual (or on a subset of the most pro-
ductive individuals if this designation not unique).
The utilitarian social welfare function sums the payoffs
over all individuals, including the allocator. It attaches
the same weight to the payoff of each and every indivi-
dual and thus features other-regarding preferences more
strongly than the OPMA target function:




When a social utilitarian allocator UA decides to serve
individual k with the minimal endowment mk, he will
consider the corresponding payoff πk = mk·pk as well as
his own payoff π0 = t·mk·pk. The dominance test for the
social utilitarian then changes to
(t + 1) ·mk · pk + c > (t + 1) ·mk · p1. (7)
Individuals that are not in position 1 (i.e. all but the
most productive recipient or recipients) face a higher
threshold for being served by the UA than by the
OPMA. Hence, fewer potential recipients are included
under the utilitarian social welfare regime than under
the principle of maximizing own payoff.
2.2 The number maximizing allocator
An allocator maximizing the number of recipients
(NMA) has the following social target function:
WNMA (π0,π1,π2, ...,πn) =
∑
i
Ni with Ni =
{
0, if πi = 0
1, if πi > 0
. (8)
This allocator first ranks the set of individuals accord-
ing to increasing mi, the respective minimum ration
required for a positive payoff. If two individuals need
the same minimal amount, the one with higher produc-
tivity is ranked first. Let L be the correspondingly
ranked set of individuals where l = 1 is the individual
with the minimum mi. The number of recipients is max-
imized if the NMA follows the ranked individuals within




ml is positive. Once the endowment becomes
too small to serve a further individual, the allocator
stops f). He will be indifferent as to how to allocate the
remaining amount. To distinguish this type from the
Rawlsian allocator that is discussed below, we assume
that the remaining endowment is allocated along utili-
tarian principles, thus going to the most productive
reci-pients.
2.3 The Rawlsian allocator with lexicographic maximin
preferences
The Rawlsian allocator’s (RA) preferences over two









are represented by the lexicographi-
cal comparison of the payoff vectors for all individuals
0,1,2,...,n, arranged in increasing order. The RA prefers
distributions which maximize the payoff of the indivi-
dual 0 which is worst off. If there are several indivi-
duals 0, the RA compares the payoffs of the individuals
with index 1 and again prefers the allocation with the
higher payoff. If these, too, are equal, he proceeds to
index 3, etc. Given that, generally, not every potential
recipient can be served, the RA will first maximize the
number of recipients. Next, rather than increasing the
ration for one individual beyond mi, he will ‘save ’
another individual the remaining endowment permit-
ting. Similar to the NMA allocator, the RA will thereby
favor individuals with low minimal needs. But the RA
differs from the NMA when it comes to the allocation
of the remaining endowment. Applying Rawls’ princi-
ple [2] leads to a leximin solution with respect to the
payoffs, firstly, of those recipients who received at least
their minimum amount and, secondly, the allocator
himself. It is important here that Rawls’ criterion be
applied to the payoffs of the allocator and the recipi-
ents simultaneously. The allocation resulting from
Rawls’ criterion differs strictly from a purely egalitarian
allocation, which equalizes the allocated rations with-
out incorporating the number of recipients and with-
out taking into account the different productivities of
the potential recipients. This (naïvely) non-consequen-
tialistic egalitarian allocation is not considered here.
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3 Experimental design and identification of ideal
types of allocators
In this section we report data from a series of experi-
ments in which participants allocated a given amount of
resources to seven potential recipients in ten different
treatments. They knew that payments to themselves and
to the recipients would be based on their choices in one
out of the ten treatments, to be selected at random. A
total of 17 experimental sessions were conducted at the
Magdeburg Laboratory for Experimental Economics
(MaXLab) between December 2007 and February 2008
using Urs Fischbacher’s [3] software tool z-tree. 136 stu-
dents from the faculties of economics and medicine par-
ticipated in the experiments g). No one was permitted
to participate in more than one session. The allocators
included 36 economics students and 22 medical stu-
dents, whereas the recipients were almost all economics
students. The sessions lasted between 45 and 90 min-
utes. Participants received a show-up fee of €3 and pay-
offs depending on their choices. Average earnings were
€12.65 per person. In the allocation problems, payoffs
were described in experimental currency units (ECU),
with 100 ECU equaling €2. We used a purely economic
frame with neutrally described allocation problems in 8
sessions and a medical frame in 9 sessions, where the
potential recipients were described as patients and the
allocator as physician. The framing did not change dur-
ing the sessions, so that no individual acted under both
framings. Experimental instructions are provided in
Additional File 1: Appendix B.
Eight individuals participated in each session. At the
beginning of a session, we randomly chose one to be
the allocator. The seven remaining participants were
assigned to be recipients. Starting with session 6, we
changed this aspect of the design and let all eight sub-
jects allocate endowments among seven virtual recipi-
ents. In these sessions, only the allocators received
actual payments; and they were informed that their deci-
sions had no payoff consequences for other persons.
The information about the characteristics of the recipi-
ents did not differ between the two design variants.
The total endowment of the allocator was either 1000
ECU or 1600 ECU. The allocator’s par-ticipation rate in
the recipients’ payoffs was set at t = 0.2, and the fine for
every individual not served at c = 50 ECU. From these
parameter values, we can estimate the relative payoffs
between the allocators and the recipients as follows: If
the allocator chooses to serve all, his profit will exceed
the average recipients’ payoff by 40 percent since he
receives one fifth of their total payoffs.
In ten treatments, each representing one allocation
problem, the allocator had to decide how many ECU to
give to each of the seven individuals. The characteristics
of the recipients differed across the treatments; see Table
1. Their minimum thresholds mi range from 10 ECU to
1000 ECU. The last column presents the sum of all the
recipients’ thresholds per treatment. When given an
initial endowment of 1000 ECU, the allocator could serve
all individuals only in treatment 2. In all other treat-
ments, he is forced to forego at least one recipient and
pay the fine of 50 ECU. When the total endowment was
increased to 1600 ECU, the allocator could in principle
serve all individuals in seven out of ten treatments, thus
avoiding the fine completely. The productivity factor pi
ranges from 1 to 5 and indicates the extent to which a
recipient benefits from his allocation. For instance, in
treatment 1 a ration of 300 ECU translates into a payoff
of 1200 ECU for person 1, but only 600 for person 4.
In a slight twist to the payoff function (2), we
instructed the allocators to give each individual i whom
they wish to serve at least mi+1 ECU in order to secure
a positive payoff h). Additional File 1: Appendix A
shows the optimal solutions for all types of allocators
(Additional File 1 Table 1 for total endowment = 1000
ECU and Addi-tional File 1 Table 2 for total endow-
ment = 1600 ECU).
Table 2 shows the average payoffs for the ideal types of
allocators and their recipients in every treatment. Compared
Table 1 The 10 allocation problems
Treatment Person 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ∑
i
mi
1 mi 300 50 150 50 100 300 100 1050
pi 4 3 3 2 3 5 4
2 mi 200 100 10 50 50 10 100 520
pi 4 2 1 2 3 2 3
3 mi 300 200 500 100 100 200 300 1700
pi 4 2 1 2 3 4 1
4 mi 500 100 50 50 50 100 600 1450
pi 4 1 1 2 3 2 4
5 mi 300 100 200 100 300 200 1000 2200
pi 2 3 2 2 3 2 3
6 mi 100 50 100 50 500 100 500 1400
pi 3 3 1 2 3 2 3
7 mi 200 200 200 200 200 400 400 1800
pi 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 mi 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 1400
pi 1 2 3 1 3 2 2
9 mi 400 50 10 10 50 600 50 1170
pi 2 1 1 2 2 3 3
10 mi 100 100 100 100 100 500 500 1500
pi 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
m
i
: minimum ration individual i needs to obtain a positive payoffp
i
productivity factor, transforming
an allocated ration into a payoff for the recipient
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to the utilitarian type, the OPMA reduces the total payoff.
The NMA, and particularly the RA, reduce total payoff even
further. They both choose a lower payoff for themselves
than the OPMA does. Moreover, they allocate lower average
payoffs to the recipients than the OPMA. These results, of
course, reflect the target functions of the NMA and the RA,
because both types give primary consideration to maximiz-
ing the number of recipients and consider the recipients’
payoffs only as a secondary criterion.
When the total endowment is higher, allocator and
recipient payoffs differ more - in percent - under num-
ber maximizing or Rawlsian social orientation than
under the OPMA principle. This effect is reversed for
the utilitarian type: Here the percentage difference
between the allocator’s payoffs and the total payoff is
bigger if R = 1000 ECU, but smaller for the sum of the
recipients’ payoffs. Being a utilitarian (and maximizing
total payoff) rather than being selfish is more “costly” to
the allocator if the available amount to be distributed is
smaller, i.e. when scarcity is more severe. For the other
types, the costs of being utilitarian as compared to being
selfish are higher when the shadow price of the resource
constraint increases.
The 58 allocators made a total of 3,948 allocation
decisions i. Table 3 provides information on the number
of treatments, allocators and observations in the two
framings, for high and low budgets, real and virtual reci-
pients, and the allocator’s profession. A treatment is
defined as a decision problem in which a given endow-
ment is allocated among 7 potential recipients. A treat-
ment thus provides 7 observations of allocations. With
ten treatments in a session, each allocator takes 70 deci-
sions in total.
4 Results
4.1 Classification of allocator
Based on their actual choices, we classified the allocator-
subjects according to their proximity to one of the four
ideal types described above using a variance test j). An
allocator was classified as belonging to one type if this
mean Euclidian distance from the respective optimal
choice was significantly smaller than his mean Euclidian
distance from the optimal choices of the three alterna-
tives. Table 4 shows the classification results for both
the economic and the medical settings. In addition to
‘pure’ types, we also observe individuals which are in
Table 2 The average treatment payoffs of the allocators and their recipients for the four ideal types of social












Type R = 1000 R = 1600 R = 1000 R = 1600 R = 1000 R = 1600





































UA: utilitarian allocator, OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator, RA: Rawlsian allocator
Table 3 Number of treatments, allocators, and observations
Framing Budget Recipients No. of treatments No. of allocators No. of observations
Economists Physicians Economists Physicians
Medical high real 0 0 0 0 0
virtual 134 7 8 378 560
low real 60 0 6 0 420
virtual 80 8 0 560 0
Neutral high real 0 0 0 0 0
virtual 160 8 8 560 560
low real 50 5 0 350 0
virtual 80 8 0 560 0
Total 564 36 22 2408 1540
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between two types. If these tests were inconclusive for
an allocator - so neither significantly close to one type
nor in between two types - (at the 10 percent signifi-
cance level), this individual was not classified.
Not one of the 58 allocators was classified as being a
social utilitarian who maximizes the total payoff. Among
the economists, 19 percent were classified as OPMA,
compared to 9 percent among the physicians. At 44 per-
cent, the share of NMA among economists is higher
than that among physicians by a factor of 1.6. Only 3 of
the 36 economists were classified as RA, while as many
as 7 out of 22 physicians appear to lean towards Raw-
lsian leximin allocations. The mixed types confirm this
tendency: 5 physicians and only 1 economist were classi-
fied as the mixed NMA/RA type. Unclassified allocators
made up around 14 percent among econo-mists and
only 5 percent among physicians.
4.2 Framing and professional effects
In this section, we want to shed light on the effects of
the medical and neutral framing as well as on possible
differences in the choices made by economists and phy-
sicians. Table 5 shows the mean Euclidean distances of
the decisions made by the three allocator types in the
two professional populations, based on the allocated
payoffs including the allocator’s. While economists lean
towards maximizing their own payoff, the physicians are
closest to the allocator type that maximizes the number
of recipients.
Regarding framing, the results suggest that economists
move further away from the allocator types - most
accentuated in the case of the OPMA - when the setting
is medical as compared to the neutral, purely economic
framing. By contrast, physicians are closer to one of the
three types when the framing is medical. Thus, it
appears that the classification becomes clearer when the
setting corresponds to the allocator’s own professional
background. When the setting is unfamiliar, the cate-
gories of the classification system prove less powerful.
This seems to indicate that “professional norms” guide
these decisions. This holds even for the OP-MA, for the
corresponding motivations become more forceful in the
setting in which it is considered legitimate to maximize
one’s own payoff.
Table 6 gives the results of variance tests for the pro-
fessional and framing effects described above. The last
row shows that physicians are significantly further away
from the OPMA payoff than economists. The opposite
goes for the Rawlsian types. The framing effects are sur-
prising, since they work in different directions for econ-
omists and physicians. When the setting is medical,
economists allocate in less own-payoff maximizing ways,
while physicians move towards payoff maximization.
Economists seem to get cold feet in the medical setting
and move away from their professional focus on maxi-
mizing a given objective function. It holds well for the
physicians, too, that their professional norms emerge
more clearly in the setting familiar to them k).
4.3 Efficiency costs
The efficiency cost of an allocator’s choices corresponds




πi . Table 7 shows these costs by profession and
framing. While framing effects are more or less absent,





neutral medical Total neutral medical total
UA 0 0 0 0 0 0
UA/OPMA 0 1 1 0 0 0
OPMA 6 1 7 1 1 2
OPMA/NMA 1 2 3 0 1 1
NMA 10 6 16 2 4 6
NMA/RA 0 1 1 2 3 5
RA 2 1 3 3 4 7
Not classified 2 3 5 0 1 1
Total 21 15 36 8 14 22
UA: utilitarian allocator, OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator,
RA: Rawlsian allocator





neutral medical neutral medical
OPMA 444 643 789 612
NMA 399 502 552 462
RA 622 682 569 528
OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator, RA: Rawlsian allocator
Table 6 Framing and professional effects (relative
squared Euclidian distance to the types of allocator) -
results from a variance test
Type OPMA NMA RA
Faculty Framing effect (medical vs. neutral setting)
Economists 1.45*** 1.26* 1.10
Physicians (1/1.29)** (1/1.20) (1/1.08)
Faculty effect (physicians vs. economists)
1.28** 1.12 (1/1.19)**
OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator, RA: Rawlsian allocator
***, (**), [*] significant at the 99% (95%) [90%] confidence level, resp.
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the difference between economists and physicians is
considerable and statistically significant. While the econ-
omists’ choices lead to an efficiency cost of between 9
and 12 percent, the choices made by the physicians
involve an efficiency loss of 16 to 20 percent. The size
of the efficiency costs in percentage terms appears not
to depend on the total endowment.
Interestingly, although we find many OPMA, the sec-
ond part of Table 7 indicates that the average willing-
ness to sacrifice one’s own profits to pursue other goals
is large. It compares the allocators’ own payoffs to those
of an ideal-type OPMA. Economists choose a payoff
that is between 4.5 percent and 10.6 percent lower than
that of the OPMA. For physicians, the payoff is as much
as 11.7 percent to 17.3 percent lower. The allocators’
sacrifice of their own profits decreases when total
endowment increases. As with the efficiency costs, fram-
ing effects are absent and professional effects are statisti-
cally significant regarding the chosen amount of own
profit.
5 Who is served and how much do they receive?
Hypotheses and tests
The way an allocator distributes the endowment
depends on his target function, the budget and the char-
acteristics of the potential recipients. As the latter para-
meters are the same for all allocators, differences among
them will arise due to differences in their target
functions.
5.1 The determinants of a positive payoff
Let us first consider the OPMA. His criterion for ser-




t · mk > p1. (9)
It follows that the OPMA is more likely to choose
individuals who are very productive or need only a
small minimum ration.
An NMA and an RA will not, as a first criterion, con-
sider the individuals’ productivity when deciding whom
to serve. The decisive parameter in their first move is
the individuals’ minimum need. They will first choose
individuals with a small minimum need, allowing them
to maximize the number of recipients with positive pay-
offs. If, for example, there are two individuals with the
same minimum need but different productivities and
only one of them can be served, we assume that the
NMA then allocates the minimum amount to the indi-
vid-ual with the higher productivity (and the rest to the
served recipient with the highest productivity). The RA
will also choose this individual, but allocate the remain-
ing amount according to the leximin criterion. The dis-
tributive problems often feature several recipients with
the same minimum amount but different productivities.
If not all of them can be served, productivity will play a
role. We therefore also expect productivity to have a
small influence on the probability of being served by
these types.
Under certain parameter constellations (different from
those in our experiments), the own-payoff maximizing
selection of recipients could even equal that of the other
allocators. If the participation factor t were very low or
the fine c were very high, every individual would pass
the dominance test. In this case, an OPMA will also
maximize the number of recipients with positive payoffs
and serve the same individuals as the other allocators.
We can thus derive the following propositions con-
cerning the allocation of positive rations to individuals:
Proposition set 1: The OPMA, the NMA, and the RA
are more likely to serve an individual whose minimum
need is low. Only the OPMA has a strong concern
regarding an individual’s productivity. His willingness to





neutral medical neutral medical





R = 1000 3834.44 (100) 3375.97 (88.0) 3417.36 (89.1) — (—) 3087.71 (80.5)
R = 1600 6312.44 (100) 5695.27 (90.2) 5787.23 (91.7) 5289.35 (83.8) 5255.80 (83.3)
OPMAa) Own profit π0
R = 1000 510.42 (100) 456.57 (89.4) 460.71 (90.3) — (—) 422.26 (82.7)
R = 1600 950.42 (100) 908.07 (95.5) 910.53 (95.8) 838.85 (88.3) 838.99 (88.3)
UA: utilitarian allocator, OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocatora)
for the values see Table 2
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allocate a positive ration increases the more productive
the potential recipient is.
In order to test proposition set 1, we ran a logit
regression that exploits the panel structure of the data.
We applied a random effects model to account for the
possibility of specific correlation between the error
terms of an allocator’s choices. Then we included
dummy variables for the treatments, since the shadow
price of the total endowment depends on the sum of
the minimum thresholds, which differs from treatment
to treatment. Treatment 2 has the lowest sum∑
i
mi = 520 ECU and served as benchmark treatment.
Total endowment is included with a dummy variable
which takes on the value 1 for R = 1600 ECU and 0 for
R = 1000 ECU. Moreover, absolute and slope dummies
for the different types were incorporated, with the
unclassified allocators serving as benchmark.
For the potential recipients, the mean probability of a
positive payoff was 75.3 percent. Table 8 presents the
results of the logit model. The likelihood ratio test for
rho = 0 indicates that the joint hypothesis of zero slope
coefficient can be rejected.
Regarding the treatment effect on the probability of
being served, the coefficient shows the expected sign. As
the resources were always scarcer than in treatment 2,
the probability of a positive payoff was significantly
lower in those treatments.
In the neutral framing of the allocation problem fewer
potential recipients were served than in the medical set-
ting, though the difference is not significant. The
dummy for sessions where only one individual acted as
allocator is positive, indicating that the presence of
actual recipients in the laboratory positively affects the
allocator’s willingness to serve them. This result, how-
ever, is not significant. The endowment dummy shows
the expected sign. When the endowment rises to 1600
ECU, significantly more potential recipients are served.
The intercept dummies differentiate between pure and
mixed types of allocators. NMA, RA, and their mixed
type served more recipients than OPMA on average.
The probability of a positive payoff falls significantly
with an increase in a potential recipient’s minimum
threshold. This effect is significant and stronger for
NMA, but not for OPMA and RA.
Finally, the productivity of potential recipients has a
large effect on the probability of being served. The
effects are significant and larger for NMA, but not for
OPMA.
5.2 Explaining the conditioned positive allocation
The second choice refers to the size of the allocated
ration, conditional on the payoff being positive. The
experimental design implies that the ration must be
higher than the minimum threshold. Therefore, explain-
ing the conditioned positive allocation means explaining
the extra ration ri- mi. We already know that OPMA
allocates the minimum ration to all individuals he
chooses to serve, except for the most productive, who
receives the entire remaining endowment. A general
relationship between the allocated extra ration ri- mi
and a potential recipient’s productivity cannot be
Table 8 Explaining the probability of positive payoffs: a logit model
Variables Coefficient Std. err. Variable Coefficient Std. err.
Constant -0.790 0.543 OPMA 0.024 0.652
treatment_1 -2.557*** 0.313 OPMA .NMA 0.457 0.643
treatment_3 -1.376*** 0.306 NMA 1.149** 0.554
treatment_4 -1.078*** 0.295 NMA.RA 1.748*** 0.556
treatment_5 -1.326*** 0.297 RA 2.252*** 0.708
treatment_6 -0.776*** 0.302
treatment_7 -1.002*** 0.290 Minimum need -0.007*** 0.001
treatment_8 -1.377*** 0.289 OPMA .minimum need 0.001 0.001
treatment_9 0.039 0.315 NMA .minimum need -0.002*** 0.001
treatment_10 -0.920*** 0.299 RA .minimum need 0.000 0.001
Economic framing -0.349 0.273 Productivity 1.314*** 0.117
1 allocator only 0.398 0.380 OPMA.Productivity 0.282 0.193
Endowment 1.568*** 0.312 NMA .productivity 0.422*** 0.166
RA .productivity 0.043 0.224
Number of observations: 3,948 Number of groups: 58
Pseudo R2: 0.26 Rho: 0.188*** 0.042
UA: utilitarian allocator, OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator, RA: Rawlsian allocator
***, (**), [*] significant at the 99% (95%) [90%] confidence level, resp.
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derived, as the extra ration will be positive for the most
productive individual only. Still, a negative correlation
can be excluded.
The allocator maximizing the number of recipients
will, in a first stage, be indifferent as to who receives the
rest. We assume that, in a second stage, he wants to
maximize his profit. Like the selfish distributor, he will
allocate the remaining endowment to the most produc-
tive recipients.
The Rawlsian allocator will try to improve the payoff
of those with a low initial level of pi·mi. Hence, the
extra ration ri- mi received should be negatively corre-
lated with pi·mi.
This comparative statics analysis leads to
Proposition set 2: The extra rations allocated by
OPMA and NMA are positively related to the recipients’
productivity. RA will increase a recipient’s ration whose
initial payoff (pi·mi) is low.
The payoff was positive in 77.7 percent of the deci-
sions, providing 3,068 observations. Reci-pients received
an average extra ration of 64.04 ECU. Table 9 presents
the results of a random effects OLS estimation with the
extra ration as the dependent variable.
The sign of the coefficients for the different types’
intercept dummies can be explained as follows. As
OPMA and NMA choose an extra ration of zero more
often than the other types (see the last section), their
allocated extra rations are on average lower. When the
endowment is larger, the average extra ration increases,
which is not necessarily expected.
The signs of the slope dummies for the allocator types
are also as expected. In the case of OPMA and NMA,
the allocated extra rations grow with increasing recipi-
ent productivity, though not significantly for NMA. The
RA’s extra rations are negatively correlated with pi·mi, as
we hypothesized.
5.3 Discussion of the variance in the behavior
Clearly, theories of inequality aversion ([4-8], and [1])
seem relevant for the allocation decisions we study in
our experiment. We use the Fehr-Schmidt model [4]
to explain how these theories shape the predictions for
our pure social choice types and increase the variance
in the data. In this approach (Bolton-Ockenfels [5] is
similar), the participants obtain positive utility from
decreasing inequality. The theory is based on the idea
that, due to social comparisons, one’s utility decreases
either if one has a lower payoff than others (envy) or a
higher payoff than others (altruism). The relative
importance of these two aspects of social orientation
can be adjusted by the choice of positive parameters a0
and b0, respectively. The measure for lower and higher
payoffs is given by the sum of the distance of the
others’ payoff to one’s own. Finally, the utility function
is additively separable into utility derived from one’s
own payoff and disutility derived from social compari-
sons (i.e. can be split into an envy and an altruism
part):
WFS (π1, ...,πn) = π0 − a0N − 1
∑
i
max {πi − π0, 0 } − b0N − 1
∑
i
max {π0 − πi, 0 } (10)
If we changed the utility functions of the allocators in
our experiment accordingly, we would obviously get
deviations from the pure types we characterized in the
previous sections. Applying the Fehr-Schmidt utility
function to a selfish allocator produces deviations
towards the Rawlsian type, who favors more equal pay-
offs even for small values of b0. Applying the Fehr-
Schmidt utility function to the Rawlsian type, we would
get towards the selfish allocator. Depending on the para-
meters, the deviations would vary according to the per-
sonal characteristics of the decision maker. The variance
in our data might be partly explained by mixed types of
social orientation. Since we are interested in the pure
social choice types and did not use target functions with
two parameters, we accept a less good fit of our data
with the theoretical choice predic-tion.
6 Conclusion
We started our analysis of decision behavior by applying
different distributive principles that reflect general social
orientation. We determined allocations resulting from
selfish payoff maximization, allocations that maximize a
utilitarian sum of payoffs including that of the allocator,
allocations that maximize the number of treated
patients, and Rawlsian allocations.
Table 9 Explaining the extra ration ri-miof recipients with
positive payoffs (OLS with random effects)
Variables Coefficient Std. err.
Constant 10.99 18.61
OPMA -233.52*** 29.14





Minimum need -0.01 0.02
Productivity 60.18*** 4.61
OPMA .productivity 53.82*** 8.72
NMA .productivity 2.78 6.46
RA .productivity .minimum need -0.08*** 0.01
Number of observations = 2,973 Number of Groups = 58
R2: within = 0.169 R2: between = 0.279 R2: overall = 0.175
OPMA: own payoff-maximizing allocator, NMA: number maximizing allocator, RA: Rawlsian allocator
***, (**), [*] significant at the 99% (95%) [90%] confidence level, resp.
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There is a vast health economics literature that deals
with the effects of patient-related factors (such as age,
social role, and health-related lifestyle) and of treatment
characteristics (the duration of the intervention effects
and severity of an illness prior to intervention) on the
allocation decisions made by physicians (see [9] for an
overview). This experiment implements two abstract
characteristics of patients (minimum need and the pro-
ductivity of treatment) and the clearable resource (time
or money) and dissociates from specific treatment con-
ditions and patient characteristics.
We did not identify any social utilitarians among the
58 allocators. Correspondingly, the social costs of the
observed choices are substantial, ranging from 10 per-
cent for economists to 20 percent for physicians. On the
other hand, the allocators do not appear to maximize
their own payoff. The willingness to forego own payoff
is considerable, around 5 to 17 percent of the maximum
possible profit. The amount is smaller for economists,
but both professional groups sacrifice an amount of
money for purposes other than their own payoff. The
sacrificed percentage becomes smaller if the endowment
increases.
One in five economists is an own payoff maximizer,
whereas only one in eleven physicians can be classified
in this way. By comparison, one in three physicians is a
Rawlsian, compared to only one in twelve economists.
Thus, the distributive norms held by different profes-
sions appear to have an influence on people’s decisions.
Furthermore, the economists are sensitive to framing
effects. They are closer to own payoff-maximizing beha-
vior in the neutral framing than in the medical setting.
Surprisingly, physicians are closer to own-payoff maxi-
mization in the medical setting, though their behavior is
generally less strongly affected by framing.
Another set of results focuses on monotonicity relations,
which are important theoretical properties of many alloca-
tion rules. How do the decision makers react to an
increase in the amount of the available resource? We find
that if resources are scarcer, the probability of a positive
payoff for the recipients is significantly smaller for most of
the treatments as fewer potential recipients are served.
This is in line with normative properties of resource
monotonicity. For example, this axiom, typically applied to
distributive problems in normative bargaining theory (cf.
[10]), requires that an increase in the resource not make
anybody worse off. Although we did not analyze this prop-
erty on an individual basis, the data on the probability of
being served and on the number of recipients with positive
payoff do in fact show a reaction in the required direction.
This observation holds for all the allocators and can there-
fore be interpreted as a general property of revealed social
orientation.
Two other monotonicity relations are fundamental
due to the structure of the decision prob-lems: reactions
to differing minimum needs and to differing productiv-
ities of the potential recipients. A smaller minimum
need should in general lead to a higher probability of
being served. Again, we observe the expected tendency
for all types of allocators. However, the effect is stron-
gest for the allocator maximizing the number of recipi-
ents. The effect of higher productivity on the probability
of receiving a positive payoff is positive, as one would
expect. Surprisingly, this effect is strongest in the case
of the number maximizing allocator. One explanation
stems from the specific design of the allocation pro-
blems: Conflicts can arise in deciding on the last indivi-
dual to include in the group of actual recipients. If there
are two potential recipients with the same minimum
need but with different productivities and only one can
be served, which one should it be? The data confirm
that, in such a conflict, productivity is a decisive prop-
erty for the allocator maximizing the number of
recipients.
Additional material
Additional File 1: Supporting information. Contains additional data
detailing experimental design and sample instructions for the
experiment.
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Endnotes
a) Different variants of utilitarianism and egalitarianism lead to a variety of
allocation rules. A good overview of applicable distributive rules and their
normative properties is given by Young (1994), while Williams and Cookson
(2000) lay out the implications of various philosophical theories of justice for
the appraisal of health distributions within a community [11,12].
b) Complete selfishness or complete unselfishness is not at issue in our
experiment, but rather a more realistic decision-making process that
emerges when motives are of a mixed nature. Of course, it may be disputed
whether the relative strengths of self-regarding and other-regarding
preferences correspond to the specification of the payoff function. The
particulars, however, are not too important for the issue at hand: The
exploration of the decision rules that we can observe aside from the
maximization of a payoff function already represent mixed self- and other-
regarding motivations.
c) In the experiment, we instructed the distributors that mi+1 units were
required for the payoff of a recipient to be positive. While our formulation
of the inequalities in (2) is easier to handle, for both mathematical and
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linguistic reasons, this change has no implication for the validity of the
results.
d) Clearly, a ‘hard-nosed economist’ would try to reduce this to an
apprehension of potential loss of reputation. But even on the view that “a
bad conscience is nothing but the suspicion that somebody else may be
watching”, it appears that this suspicion presents itself to the allocator in the
moment of decision making as independent of the calculation of expected
future consequences. Therefore, whatever the ultimate explanation, the
proximate one would still be a local constraint on case-by-case optimization
as assumed in standard rational choice analysis.
e) Note that the methodological precept of experimental economics that
the specific payoffs be kept private information does not apply here, since
we are not dealing with a strategic interaction but rather with a social
choice experiment.
f) Due to the discreteness of the constraint set, the choice of the last
recipient is generally more complicated. It is possible that skipping one
person and serving the next is more profitable to the allocator. In practice,
however, this difficulty arises in only two of the ten treatments.
g) The subject pool consisted of third and fourth year medical students and
advanced economics students.
h) See the instructions in Additional File 1: Appendix B
i) We did not observe 4060 (= 58 × 70) decisions, since fewer than ten
treatments were con-ducted in one session due to technical difficulties.
j) For all types, there is more than one optimal choice of whom to serve in
some treatments. If this was the case, we considered the variant that was
most similar to the subject’s choice. Moreover, where more than one
potential recipient as most productive and passed the dominance test (5),
the UA, the OPMA, and the NMA are indifferent as to whom to allocate the
remaining endowment to. We accounted for this by considering these
recipients simultaneously in the variance test in order to avoid a
classification bias.
k) The results in Table 6 also hold up to a parametric X2-test.
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